Work incentives and household insurance: sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.01.028zbMath1254.91262OpenAlexW2246613942WikidataQ115791638 ScholiaQ115791638MaRDI QIDQ1929380

Cécile Aubert

Publication date: 8 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3039/1/aubert.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardincentivesaltruism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Common Agency

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