A note on uniqueness of electoral equilibrium when the median voter is unobserved

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.02.006zbMath1254.91014OpenAlexW1972024088MaRDI QIDQ1929406

John Duggan

Publication date: 8 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

median votermixed strategyprobabilistic votingvote maximization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites Work

• Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates