Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.023zbMath1254.91527OpenAlexW2008751348MaRDI QIDQ1929428

Sam Schulhofer-Wohl

Publication date: 8 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.023

zbMATH Keywords

risk sharingtransferable utilityassortative matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Assortative matching and risk sharing ⋮ Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty ⋮ Inefficient sorting under output sharing ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk

Cites Work

• When do market games have transferable utility?
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves
• Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment

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