Bargaining and waning commitments

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.031zbMath1254.91197OpenAlexW2125357588MaRDI QIDQ1929432

Bernardo Moreno, Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 8 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.031

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect Nash equilibriumbilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining

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