The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
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Publication:1929438
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.03.033zbMath1254.91224OpenAlexW2001675639MaRDI QIDQ1929438
Publication date: 8 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.033
Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
- Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
- Generalized Expected Utility Analysis of Multivariate Risk Aversion
- "Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
- "Preference Reversal" and the Observability of Preferences by Experimental Methods
- Dominance Axioms and Multivariate Nonexpected Utility Preferences
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