Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.047zbMath1254.91209OpenAlexW2034628815MaRDI QIDQ1929446

Jacques Crémer, Charles Z. Zheng, Yossef Spiegel

Publication date: 8 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2382/1/Cremer_2382.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

search costsfull surplus extractioncorrelated valuesoptimal auctionsearch mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition ⋮ Auctions with costly information acquisition

Cites Work

• Search mechanisms
• Optimal repeated purchases when sellers are learning about costs
• Optimal search auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

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