Testable implications of coalitional rationality

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.046zbMath1254.91372OpenAlexW2013170879MaRDI QIDQ1929447

Ruediger Bachmann

Publication date: 8 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.046

zbMATH Keywords

coretestabilitynon-parametric restrictionsallocation data

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (2)

Testable implications of the core in TU market games ⋮ Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

Cites Work

• Testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individualrationality
• Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
• Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification.
• Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies.
• Rationalizing allocation data -- a nonparametric Walrasian theory when prices are absent or non-Walrasian
• Revealed Preferences and Differentiable Demand
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data

This page was built for publication: Testable implications of coalitional rationality