Propositional reasoning that tracks probabilistic reasoning

DOI10.1007/s10992-012-9237-3zbMath1272.03032OpenAlexW2153734288MaRDI QIDQ1929756

Kevin T. Kelly, Hanti Lin

Publication date: 9 January 2013

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9237-3

zbMATH Keywords

belief revisionprobabilistic reasoninglottery paradoxuncertain acceptanceBayesian conditioningGettier problemuncertain propositional reasoning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Related Items (19)

Formal epistemology ⋮ PROBABILISTIC STABILITY, AGM REVISION OPERATORS AND MAXIMUM ENTROPY ⋮ Bayesian stopping ⋮ A basis for AGM revision in Bayesian probability revision ⋮ Bridging ranking theory and the stability theory of belief ⋮ Belief, credence, and evidence ⋮ Belief Revision from Probability ⋮ Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities* ⋮ The Review Paradox: On The Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction ⋮ A game-theoretic approach to peer disagreement ⋮ Adjectival vagueness in a Bayesian model of interpretation ⋮ Rigged lotteries: a diachronic problem for reducing belief to credence ⋮ Foundations of everyday practical reasoning ⋮ Tracking Information ⋮ Theory choice, theory change, and inductive truth-conduciveness ⋮ What should I believe about what would have been the case? ⋮ Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes ⋮ Two approaches to belief revision ⋮ A probabilistic semantics for belief logic

Cites Work

• A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic
• Temporal logics in AI: semantical and ontological considerations
• Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
• Rational belief change, Popper functions and counterfactuals
• The extent of non-conglomerability of finitely additive probabilities
• For the Sake of the Argument
• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions

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