VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.028zbMath1254.91232OpenAlexW2135078692MaRDI QIDQ1929830

Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz

Publication date: 9 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/%7Elsbester/papers/vcginvestments.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designexternalitiesefficient mechanismssecond price auctionex ante investments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Long-Term Partnership for Achieving Efficient Capacity Allocation

Cites Work

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• Efficient Auctions
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design