Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting

DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9290-3zbMath1280.91105OpenAlexW2145932366MaRDI QIDQ1930907

Bernd Theilen

Publication date: 14 January 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/169684

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcollusioncontract delegationinterim side-contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Decentralization and collusion
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• Monitoring Gains and Decentralization
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• On some agency costs of intermediated contracting

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