History as a coordination device
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1930909
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9264-5zbMath1280.91006OpenAlexW2132155843MaRDI QIDQ1930909
Itzhak Gilboa, Rossella Argenziano
Publication date: 14 January 2013
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275700/files/8-2006.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
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