Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
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Publication:1932540
DOI10.1007/S11579-010-0035-9zbMath1255.91205OpenAlexW2097307635MaRDI QIDQ1932540
Publication date: 20 January 2013
Published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-010-0035-9
envyhidden actionbehavioral contract theoryjealousymulti-agent problemsoptimal effortpay-for-performance sensitivity
Related Items (8)
Time-consistent investment and reinsurance under relative performance concerns ⋮ Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management ⋮ Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance ⋮ Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents ⋮ Optimal R\&D investment strategy of pollution abatement and incentive mechanism design under asymmetric information ⋮ Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion ⋮ LINKED RECURSIVE PREFERENCES AND OPTIMALITY ⋮ Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
Cites Work
- The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
- BSDE with quadratic growth and unbounded terminal value
- OPTIMAL MULTI-AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Theories of Pay and Unemployment: Survey Evidence from Swedish Manufacturing Firms
- Corporate Governance
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