A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018zbMath1255.91020OpenAlexW3123718636MaRDI QIDQ1934023

Anke Gerber, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2005/65605.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalition formationhedonic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage