A note on common agency models of moral hazard

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.10.021zbMath1255.91056OpenAlexW201782980MaRDI QIDQ1934052

Andrea Attar, Nicolás Porteiro, Gwenaël Piaser

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3055/1/attar_piaser_porteiro.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common agencymenus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences ⋮ Participation in moral hazard problems ⋮ On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

Cites Work

• Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Common Agency
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games