Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.005zbMath1255.91096OpenAlexW2269191963MaRDI QIDQ1934066

Koji Takamiya

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13938

zbMATH Keywords

coalition strategy-proofnesssocial choice functionmaskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts ⋮ Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals ⋮ Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems ⋮ The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions

Cites Work

• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

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