Can labor markets help resolve collusion?

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.007zbMath1255.91199OpenAlexW3122657452MaRDI QIDQ1934067

Jeremy Bertomeu

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

marketreplacementimplementationcollusiontacit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information

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