The impossibility of a paretian rational: a Bayesian perspective

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.008zbMath1255.91095OpenAlexW1965445794MaRDI QIDQ1934094

Klaus Nehring

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto principlejudgment aggregationgroup choiceBayesian aggregationopinion pool

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case ⋮ Introduction to judgment aggregation ⋮ Justifiable group choice ⋮ The rarity of consistent aggregators

Cites Work

• Combining probability distributions: A critique and an annotated bibliography
• Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
• The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory
• Consistent Bayesian aggregation
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• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems