Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.017zbMath1255.91319OpenAlexW2046764764MaRDI QIDQ1934101

Sungwhee Shin, Sang-Chul Suh

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.017

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyindividual rationalitynon-manipulabilitypermit sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Ontario Canada N9B3P4
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
• Manipulation via Endowments

This page was built for publication: Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem