Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.022zbMath1255.91159OpenAlexW2143114434MaRDI QIDQ1934150

Kasper Leufkens, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/882199/guid-80c00258-6844-40b3-a124-914c0665c084-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbankruptcyprocurementsynergies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation

Cites Work

• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
• Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions

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