Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.030zbMath1255.91098OpenAlexW2031066935MaRDI QIDQ1934162

Jianxin Yi

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.030

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitystrategy-proofnessNash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals ⋮ Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

This page was built for publication: Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness