Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.033zbMath1255.91039OpenAlexW1973954512MaRDI QIDQ1934164

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184331

zbMATH Keywords

discountingincomplete informationrepeated gameconflictreputationrisk limits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox
• Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• The battle of the sexes when the future is important
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

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