The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.036zbMath1255.91162OpenAlexW2164833817MaRDI QIDQ1934166

Aggey Semenov, David Martimort

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16187/1/martimort_semenov2.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common agencylobbypluralistic politics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Common agency with risk-averse agent ⋮ Transparency and special interests ⋮ Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ⋮ A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game ⋮ Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections

Cites Work

• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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