Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.03.019zbMath1255.91097OpenAlexW1972775989MaRDI QIDQ1934173

Jianxin Yi, Haixiang Yao

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.03.019

zbMATH Keywords

dictatorshipstrict monotonicityfull implementation in dominant strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

This page was built for publication: Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies