Common knowledge and limit knowledge
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Publication:1934277
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9257-4zbMath1281.91031OpenAlexW2155077643MaRDI QIDQ1934277
Christian W. Bach, Jérémie Cabessa
Publication date: 28 January 2013
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9257-4
Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (2)
Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Agreeing to Disagree with Limit Knowledge
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