Common knowledge and limit knowledge

DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9257-4zbMath1281.91031OpenAlexW2155077643MaRDI QIDQ1934277

Christian W. Bach, Jérémie Cabessa

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9257-4

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeinteractive epistemologyepistemic game theoryAumann structureslimit knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Agreeing to Disagree with Limit Knowledge

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