Fear of losing in a clock auction

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0121-yzbMath1255.91144OpenAlexW2111672914MaRDI QIDQ1934562

Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Y. Ozbay, Pacharasut Sujarittanonta

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/cramton-filiz-ozbay-sujarittanonta-fear-of-losing.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

regretclock auctionlowest accepted bidprovisional winner

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Fear of losing in a clock auction ⋮ Loss aversion in sequential auctions ⋮ Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
• Reference-dependent subjective expected utility.
• Fear of losing in a clock auction
• Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
• Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*

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