Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0123-9zbMath1257.91012OpenAlexW2064141087MaRDI QIDQ1934565

Neslihan Uler, Sarah L. Taylor, Yusufcan Masatlioglu

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0123-9

zbMATH Keywords

auctionmechanism designlaboratory experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Mediated talk: an experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions
• Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Framing the first-price auction
• First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now prices with Allais paradox bidders
• Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders
• Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?

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