A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0126-6zbMath1282.91055OpenAlexW2030126383MaRDI QIDQ1934573

Syngjoo Choi

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0126-6

zbMATH Keywords

social learningsocial networksbounded rationalitycognitive hierarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

Modeling customer bounded rationality in operations management: a review and research opportunities ⋮ Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games ⋮ Social learning in networks: a quantal response equilibrium analysis of experimental data ⋮ Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study ⋮ Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality

Cites Work

• Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Bayesian learning in social networks.
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Social learning in networks: a quantal response equilibrium analysis of experimental data
• The two-person beauty contest
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• A Simplex Method for Function Minimization

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