Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions

DOI10.1007/s00712-011-0250-8zbMath1255.91143OpenAlexW1965828565MaRDI QIDQ1934575

Aitor Ciarreta, Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0250-8

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycost heterogeneitysupply function competitioncollusive behaviour

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Managerial collusive behavior under asymmetric incentive schemes

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• The Bargaining Problem
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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