Controlling collusion in auctions: the role of ceilings and reserve prices

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.04.033zbMath1255.91142OpenAlexW1749064618MaRDI QIDQ1934692

Prabal Roy Chowdhury

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.033

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscollusionceilingsreserve prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility

Cites Work

• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers

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