Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.05.012zbMath1255.91148OpenAlexW3122054527MaRDI QIDQ1934695

Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Cuihong Fan

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13385/1/166.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsentryprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
• Auctions with entry
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• Participation in auctions
• Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis

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