Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.036zbMath1255.91085OpenAlexW1986902971MaRDI QIDQ1934706

Yohei Sekiguchi, Minoru Kitahara

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.036

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationCondorcet jury theoremlarge electionscostly information acquisitionnormal noise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Unnamed Item

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