Interim bribery in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.06.032zbMath1255.91156OpenAlexW2048525344MaRDI QIDQ1934743

William S. Neilson, Sevket Alper Koc

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.032

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbriberycorruptionrevenue equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer

Cites Work

• Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
• Corruption and auctions
• Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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