A climate agreement with full participation

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.013zbMath1255.91317OpenAlexW2041094501MaRDI QIDQ1934764

Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.013

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsparticipationenforcementweakly renegotiation-proof equilibriumclimate regime

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Global refunding and climate change ⋮ An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases ⋮ International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries ⋮ International environmental agreements under different evolutionary imitation mechanisms

Cites Work

• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

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