Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.010zbMath1255.91165OpenAlexW2030264255MaRDI QIDQ1934772

József Molnár, Gábor Virág

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.010

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designexternalitiesinformation disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (7)

REPUTATIONAL BIDDING ⋮ Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining ⋮ Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort ⋮ Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note ⋮ Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence ⋮ Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition

Cites Work

• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

This page was built for publication: Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling