Sustainable collusion on separate markets

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.020zbMath1255.91198OpenAlexW2128824638MaRDI QIDQ1934776

Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.020

zbMATH Keywords

implicit collusionoptimal punishmentmarket sharing agreementsproduction quotas

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (3)

Extended decision field theory with social-learning for long-term decision-making processes in social networks ⋮ Multi-product supply networks: implications of intermediaries ⋮ A dynamic analysis of collusive networks

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames

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