Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.09.048zbMath1255.91110OpenAlexW2122661675MaRDI QIDQ1934808

Martine Visser, Peter Martinsson, Martin G. Kocher

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/06104.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentpublic goodspunishmentstake size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (6)

Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty: an experiment ⋮ Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: bigger is not necessarily better ⋮ Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence ⋮ Do economists punish less? ⋮ Does the truth come naturally? Time pressure increases honesty in one-shot deception games ⋮ Emotion at stake -- the role of stake size and emotions in a power-to-take game experiment in China with a comparison to Europe

Cites Work

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• Rewards and sanctions and the provision of public goods in one-shot settings
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• The effect of stakes in distribution experiments
• Does stake size matter in trust games?
• The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)
• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic

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