Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility
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Publication:1934823
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.10.014zbMath1255.91204OpenAlexW1994718149MaRDI QIDQ1934823
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.014
Related Items (3)
Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games ⋮ Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
Cites Work
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
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