On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.002zbMath1255.91136OpenAlexW1992497337MaRDI QIDQ1934836

Ola Andersson

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmarket sharesdifferent discount factorsexplicit collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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