Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.11.003zbMath1255.91149OpenAlexW2093765837MaRDI QIDQ1934837

Marco Galbiati

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6092

zbMATH Keywords

implementationenvy-freenessbest-reply dynamicsfair divisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information ⋮ Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games ⋮ A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution

Cites Work

• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
• Divide-and-permute
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication

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