Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
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Publication:1934848
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.009zbMath1255.91089OpenAlexW2032248844MaRDI QIDQ1934848
Ahmed Doghmi, Abderrahmane Ziad
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.009
Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (7)
On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
Cites Work
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- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
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- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
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