Behavioral aspects of implementation theory

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.008zbMath1255.91163OpenAlexW2055954923MaRDI QIDQ1934850

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicsimplementation theorypossibility theoremdetail-freenesswhite Lie aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information ⋮ Implementation without rationality assumptions ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes ⋮ Process manipulation in unique implementation ⋮ Nash implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Reaching consensus through approval bargaining ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions ⋮ Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
• Exact implementation
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Promises and Partnership