The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.009zbMath1255.91042OpenAlexW1974907279MaRDI QIDQ1934851

Shinichiro Takizawa

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesirreversibilitydecisions under uncertaintyimperfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Evaluating Environmental Investments: A Real Options Approach
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion

This page was built for publication: The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games