On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: type of externality and timing of policymaking

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.01.001zbMath1255.91320OpenAlexW2040916484MaRDI QIDQ1934858

Emilson C. D. Silva, Xie Zhu

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencycarbon dioxideemissions tradingenvironmental externalitydecentralized leadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding

Cites Work

• Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint
• WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY

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