Audited reputation

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035zbMath1255.91043OpenAlexW4234787028MaRDI QIDQ1934883

Hong Xu, Jianqing Chen, Andrew B. Whinston

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035

zbMATH Keywords

auditreputationinfinitely repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?

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