Private versus complete information in auctions
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Publication:1934933
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.005zbMath1255.91166OpenAlexW2014293903MaRDI QIDQ1934933
Johannes Münster, Florian Morath
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.005
Related Items (18)
On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry ⋮ All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case ⋮ ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION ⋮ Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests ⋮ Information acquisition in conflicts ⋮ Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion ⋮ Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types ⋮ Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Information disclosure on the contest mechanism ⋮ Optimal information exchange in contests ⋮ Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders ⋮ Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link ⋮ Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry ⋮ Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry ⋮ Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints ⋮ Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities ⋮ The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
Cites Work
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Information in conflicts.
- All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- (All) equilibria in a class of bidding games
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
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