Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.026zbMath1255.91227OpenAlexW3122286895MaRDI QIDQ1934941

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.026

zbMATH Keywords

information gatheringhold-up problemcomplete contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

Cites Work

• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?