A new conditional for naive truth theory

DOI10.1215/00294527-1731407zbMath1273.03073OpenAlexW1974530162MaRDI QIDQ1934956

Andrew Bacon

Publication date: 30 January 2013

Published in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1355494525

zbMATH Keywords

liar paradoxfixed-point theoremtruth theoriesintersubstitutivity ruleself-referential contexts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Substructural logics (including relevance, entailment, linear logic, Lambek calculus, BCK and BCI logics) (03B47)

Related Items (8)

Paths to triviality ⋮ Adding a conditional to Kripke's theory of truth ⋮ NAIVE TRUTH AND RESTRICTED QUANTIFICATION: SAVING TRUTH A WHOLE LOT BETTER ⋮ Conditionals in theories of truth ⋮ BINARY KRIPKE SEMANTICS FOR A STRONG LOGIC FOR NAIVE TRUTH ⋮ HYPE: a system of hyperintensional logic (with an application to semantic paradoxes) ⋮ Paradoxes of logical equivalence and identity ⋮ Non-deterministic conditionals and transparent truth

Cites Work

• Curry's paradox and \(\omega \)-inconsistency
• Notes on naive semantics
• Bilattices and the theory of truth
• The simple consistency of a set theory based on the logic CSQ
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
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