The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets

DOI10.1007/s00186-012-0381-xzbMath1267.91039OpenAlexW2152057133MaRDI QIDQ1935926

Oriol Tejada, Marina Núñez

Publication date: 20 February 2013

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/48609

zbMATH Keywords

corenucleoluscore-centermulti-sided assignment games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08)

Related Items

Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points, A survey on assignment markets, Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets, Resource location games

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