Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods

DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9311-xzbMath1282.91109OpenAlexW2127085046MaRDI QIDQ1936335

Pierre Dehez

Publication date: 4 February 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2010/2010-14.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuepublic goodscost sharingnucleolus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Sociality is a mechanism for collective action dilemma resolution ⋮ Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Properties of 1-convex \(n\)-person games
• Auctioning the provision of an indivisible public good
• A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center
• ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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