Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans's dilemma

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9327-2zbMath1282.91177OpenAlexW2052567345MaRDI QIDQ1936337

Josepa Miquel-Florensa

Publication date: 4 February 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9327-2

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddynamic contractsSamaritan dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic dynamics (91B55) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• The middle class consensus and economic development
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
• Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Employment History
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• Discounted Dynamic Programming

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